**Abstract** - Communication between prehistoric and “primitive” man
Who takes his dog for a walk knows that though man’s best friend looks at things the canine world is fundamentally one of smell and sound. Who has lived in oral cultures, 1. knows to what extent the voyeurism of the western world obliges its vis-à-vis to exhibit itself and 2. suspects that this optical option is responsible for an ethnocentrically equivocal approach to art in general and primitive and prehistoric art in particular. Without denying that Prehistoric and Primitive Man took pride in what they produced, the intrinsically oral or interlocutory nature of their interactions warrants our approaching their “artistic” productions not only from a visual angle but above all in the light of what we now know thanks to the anthropol-ogy of orality and the philosophy of action (and in particular of linguistic interaction).

**Résumé** - La communication entre l’homme préhistoriques et «primitivo»
Chi porta a spasso il proprio cane sa che la sua percezione del mondo è basata sui sensi dell’olfatto e dell’udito. Chi vissuto in culture oralì sa (1)in che misura il voyeurismo occidentale obblighi ad esibirsi e (2)intuisce come la società dell’immagi-ne sia responsabile di un equivoco approccio etnocentrico nei confronti dell’arte in generale, e dell’arte preistorica e primitiva in particolare. Senza negare che l’uomo preistorico e primitivo possa essere orgoglioso di quanto produce, la natura intrinsecamente orale e interlocutoria delle loro interazioni determina il nostro approccio alla loro produzione artistica non solo da un punto di vista visuale ma anche e soprattutto alla luce di quanto sappiamo grazie antropologia dell’oralità e alla filosofia dell’azione (e in particolare dell’interazione linguistica).

**Résumé** - La communication entre l’homme préhistoriques et «primitivo»
Qui promène son chien sait que tout en voyant des choses, son monde est olfactif. Qui avécu en oralité «primitive» sait 1. À quel point le voyeurisme du monde occidental réduit ses vis-à-vis à un exhibitionnisme pur et simple et 2. Soupçonne que cette option pour l’optique est responsable pour une vision ethnocentriquement étiquetée non seulement de l’art en général mais de l’art primitif et préhistorique en particulier. Sans nier la capacité de l’Homme Primitif ou Préhistorique d’apprécier du travail bien fait, le caractère foncièrement oral ou interlocutoire de leurs interactions, mérite qu’on aborde leurs productions «artistiques» non seulement du point de vue «matérialisation visuelle», mais aussi sinon surtout en fonction de tout ce qu’on sait désormais grâce à l’anthropologie de l’oralité et la philosophie de l’agir linguistique.

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Whether anthropologists wittingly or unwittingly collaborated with western imperialism is a moot point (Lanternari 1974). But even if proves to have been the case, it remains to be shown whether anyone, academics included, can adopt a completely neutral stance, intrinsically independent of any cultural affiliation. For there is perhaps no alternative to assuming critically one’s inevitable ethnocentrism rather than undergoing it consciously (Singleton 2004). As of now, however, it would be difficult to find an anthropologist of avowedly neo-colonialist intentions. Indeed, anthropologists have often been the first to denounce the pillaging of their chosen peoples’ natural resources. Yet paradoxically, for a discipline dedicated to the (re)cognition of the Otherness of Other Cultures (Beattie 1964), anthropology, by often presupposing a fundamental human Sameness, has contributed to the destruction of the irreducible identities of non western peoples (Singleton 2007a).

From the field monograph to the specialized study, ethnographic data has been imprisoned in the straitjackets elaborated by academics whose universities far from being universal are part and parcel

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of the westernization of the world (Latouche 1989, Singleton 2003). Though the dichotomy between Nature and Culture is peculiarly western (Singleton 2001, Descola 2004), the anthropologist, taking for granted the divide between natural and human sciences, typically opened his field report with a chapter on the physical environment, then went on to detail socio-economic and political structures, concluding with disquisitions on more specifically cultural issues such as art, philosophy and religion. From what I know of archaeological publications, they do not appear to adopt significantly different headings.

While I am far from being the only anthropologist on whom the reality finally dawned, if I might speak for myself, it has taken me a life time to realize that the WaKonongo of Tanzania who welcomed me in their midst from 1969 to 1972, did not store the facts of their lives on basically the same shelves as I did. In situ, I noted down the results of my participant observations in keeping with such classificatory categories as ecology and economics, (private) kinship and (public) politics, culture (including art) and religion. It was only years after leaving the field that I realized the extent to which their ways of doing and thinking were not primitive variations or pioneering versions of such supposedly Universal Themes as Politics, Health or Religion but African alternatives to the substances and structures with which my culture had sought to fix the phenomenal flow of things. The fields in which Africa had fenced off the evolutionary Flux might seem, on occasion, to overlap with those decided upon by other peoples and periods. None the less, they are possessed of a nuclear identity, incompatible with and incompressible to any other.

Concretely, what I had in my mind when speaking about politics, health and religion had simply never sprung to theirs. The ancestral chiefs far from being sacralized predecessors of our republican presidents, exercised no political power but functioned as the incarnate, sacramental bridges between their villagers and the “spiritual” proprietors of what we style “natural” resources such as game or the rains. Regicide in the region was not a primitive “coup d’État” but a public “coup de grace”: an ailing, failing monarch, comprising the common good he literally embodied, he was (un) ceremoniously dispatched to his ancestral homeland. The village mganga (etymologically: “remedial clairvoyant”) being expected, amongst other things, to make it rain, to prevent cattle thieves from raiding your herd, to get rid of your enemies as well as, on occasion, to cure your headache or stomach pains, he is treacherously translated by such ethnocentric expressions as “medicine man”, “indigenous healer” or “tradipractitioner”. Likewise what was described by the ethnologist and decried by the evangelizer as “the worship of ancestor spirits” and taken by both to be a primitive if not preposterous form of religion, on less ethnocentric inspection, turns out to be not much more than the symbolic expression and ceremonious consecration of a simple but fundamental fact of life, obvious to all concerned: namely that in village centred societies, the older you grew the greater became your real relevance to socio-economic survival (Singleton 2002). Materiaally you had learnt where the best land lay and where game was liable to hang out; morally, having experienced the joys and sorrows of life you could help others cope with events; metaphysically, being on the points of returning to the village of the ancestors you could negotiate with them a reasonable price for the fecundity of the womenfolk and the fertility of the fields. Between the regards rightfully shown to senior citizens (offering them as breadwinners the best portions of meat or presenting them first with home brewed beer) and the respect expressed for the recently departed (leaving tokens of food or pouring drops of beer before miniaturized huts in the compound), there was a mere formal but in no way fundamental difference. Describing the former as “purely profane politeness” and the latter as “ritual sacrificing to the spirits of the dead”, can only seem plausible to an observer programmed by his culture to oppose the “simply secular” to the “religiously sacred”. Throughout the whole of Africa (and perhaps throughout the whole of Prehistory), there being no word for what Judeo-Christians understand by religion, to (pre)suppose that there is such a thing as Primitive Religion (or that there was such a thing as Prehistoric Religion) could simply be yet another illustration of the ethnocentric recuperation of the Other for a Sameness which is no more than one’s Self.

There is no unequivocal reason (neither a priori nor a posteriori) why the ceremonial behaviour of prehistoric man have been any more peculiarly religious than its “primitive” counterpart was until recently or, for that matter, Masonic celebrations and student baptisms still are. The reason could be rendered less equivocal if ritual as the analogatum princeps (i.e. the initial anchorage of any analogical amplification) were broadly defined as “recognisably recurrent conduct”. Some such definition would suit ethologists as well as ethnologists. In terms of both belief and behaviour, in their respective sociohistoric settings, most of the time actors have a vital need to meet with consi-

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stent patterning in the fields of communication and contact. In the same way that understanding involves the relating of existentially encountered singularities (Peter or Paul, this mountain or that river) to culturally conventionalized general categories (Man, Mountain or River), being able to cope concretely implies that individuals, despite their idiosyncrasies, conform their conduct to customary expectations (such as greeting one’s neighbour in the morning or holding a knife in the right hand at table). In this general or heuristic sense it is plausible to speak of prehistoric, primitive and present day philosophical persuasions and ritual practices. Far less credible, on the other hand, has been the typical western discourse about prehistoric and primitive religion in that its undeclared analogatum princeps (or substantial starting point) has often been the theological and philosophical understanding of religion peculiar to Judeo-Christianity. Such ethnocentric equivocation comes to a head when the aesthetic productions of prehistoric and primitive peoples are not only catalogued as Art but considered to be religious.

If there is a sense in which the WaKonongo could be called religious, their religion was not about what we usually understand by the term and which typically turns around such key concepts as the sacred and the profane, God and spirits, prayer and sacrifice, ritual and doctrine, the soul and sin, this world and the next. Their religion, as we will see, was a question of interlocutory interaction. As needs arose – obtaining this year’s rain, preventing a particular misfortune – they would enter into exchange relationships with ancestrally accredited authorities. Konongo religion answering far more to the Latin (re)ligare (“to bind and bond together”) than legere (“to make speculative sense of”), I have proposed a potentially global but purely heuristic description of religion as “being obliged to symbolic Otherness in networks of asymmetrical reciprocity” (Singleton 2004).

But far more important than defining what religion could conceivably and concretely be is deciding upstream, onto-epistemologically, “what is ‘what’?” and, downstream the phenomenological “why” of particular “whats”. Though they have rarely reasoned about them, for many reasons western scholars tend to take for granted that “being something” means being objectively possessed of a substantial nature whose significance is, on principle, as universal as it is univocal. No matter what the accidental appearances of human beings (age, sex, social conditions, cultural convictions), their common nature makes them essentially identical. Whether animist, polytheist or monotheist, mankind has always been religious and expressed itself artistically. What the western mind fails to realize is that its naively extraverted empiricism (“things are already out there now for real, simply waiting to be represented subjectively as they objectively are”) and its hypostatizing essentialism (“whatever its accidental avatars – realistic, geometric, symbolic - Art is an archetypical dimension of human nature”) are due, in great part, to indo-european usage and to writing.

The situation would have been ethnocentrically bad enough if indo-european languages had simply contented themselves with inducing verbally the onto-epistemological illusion that things (such as man or mountains, rain or sunshine) were substantial realities and only afterwards set themselves in motion or are or accidentally subject to it. English users thus not only find nothing odd about such noun+verb expressions as “man evolves” or “the rain falls” but feel they reflect reality itself. Speakers of more “primitive” and possibly more prehistoric tongues such as Hopi of north American Indians “can only” (but it is a deficiency?!) think and talk about “hominisation” and “pluviation”. Archaeologists in general and students of RA (Rock Art) in particular would do well to entertain the hypothesis that prehistoric peoples too thought and spoke in terms of ongoing processes rather than finished products. Languages are not superficially different gift wrappings for essentially identical things: words are not only things themselves but are responsible for the intrinsic identification of what they intend. All translators are traitors but some translations are more treacherous than others. It is not unlikely that an Englishman would have experienced greater difficulty in translating a prehistoric tongue than a Hopi and, a fortiori, understanding what prehistoric man was talking about or expressing in RA.

Intercultural and intergenerational communication is already difficult enough orally but to make matters worse the Western world improved the Middle Eastern invention of writing by making it alphabetic. The modern mind often fails to realize the radical divide separating what Ong (1982) called primary oral cultures, completely “ignorant” of writing, from cultures who not only wrote things down but ended up by encasing them in print before their present day electronic emancipation.

1 The archaeological material primarily intended by this text can be conventionally summarized as RA for “Rock Art” – it being understood that this blanket term covers as many singularly various bedfellows as our talk of Prehistoric and Primitive Man.
2 His repeatedly republished Orality and Literacy dotted the “i’s of Goody’s pioneering works of the 1970s.
Though empirical thickening is often the only way to make the penny drop, it is obviously out of the question to detail here the complete otherness of orality together with the totalitarian tendencies shown by those peoples and periods that have crossed the threshold towards the scriptural. The most I can afford is to anchor some of this irreducible duality in my experiences of orality in Africa in the hopes that my archaeological audience might suspect the width of the communication gap separating their world from that of their prehistoric interlocutors. This chasm can only be crossed in one direction – from orality to scripturality. Though a member of a culture based on the printed word can experience secondary orality (the radio, TV and MP3) he can return to pure orality completely oblivious of the impact writing has had on his mind set and emotions.

I picked up by word of mouth a smattering of the Bantu tongue the WaKonongo spoke, thus not imprisoning it in the grammatical shackles of Indo-European terminology (nouns and verbs, adjectives and adverbs...). None the less my explicit questioning initially stemmed from my culturally preprogrammed, paradigmatic postulates. The Bantu root word for witchcraft –lozi, was predominantly prefixed by a mu or wa indicating a particular witch and given witches but it could also posses the prefix u. At first I took ulozi to mean quintessential witchcraft, an abstract reality which appeared accidentally in certain individuals who subsequently used or abused the substance in question. It took me some time to realize that far from being an archetypical abstraction, allowing for the analytical understanding of concrete cases, ulozi was, onto-epistemologically speaking, no more than a heuristic generalization, a suspicion not a substance: until a person could finger the individual responsible for his woes by giving him or her their proper name, he was obliged to use a blanket term.

Likewise I soon stopped asking the possessed questions about the very nature of their spirits (“how come if they were immaterial they eat rice and chicken?” or “why if they are superiorly intelligent do they make more mistakes in Swahili than me?”). Such scholastic demands had never spontaneously ever crossed any native mind. Spirits were simply symbols used by actors to come to satisfactory terms with stressful situations: such as tension in a polygamous household or inter-generational conflict. Since oral cultures do not speculate about the substantial natures of things but speak to real life situations, one can wonder whether RA, rather than answering to the sterility of Mrs Smith or the hunt on which her husband was about to embark, embodies what seem to our metaphysically inclined minds such essential issues as Life and Death or War and Peace.

When I first accompanied the WaKonong on a honey gathering expedition they warned me never to speak openly of bees (nyuki) but indirectly of flies (mainzi) so as not to put them on their guard. On presenting a superb Swahili translation of the Koran to a pregnant mother she at first demurred because of her impure condition. On taking it finally into her hand she did not open it but exclaimed “the baby has moved in my womb”. Short of ideas for a gift to the old Muslim chief who welcomed us into his village on the shores of Lake Guiers in northern Senegal, I presented him with a photocopy of an Arabic talisman. He crushed the copy and promptly swallowed it, proclaiming he had rarely received such a powerfully apposite present from a toubab (white man).

In oral cultures, words are not purely descriptive labels, as far removed from reality as are our titles under paintings or the list of contents printed on food packages. A speaker can do as much if not more with words than he can with tools – and not only when he blessing or cursing someone. The closest one comes in our culture to this conviction is perhaps the ex opere operato beliefs of sacramental theology. Pouring baptismal water on the heads not only of the newborn but of the still born washed away the stain of Original Sin. In the seventeenth century, panic stricken by the thought that the Chinese clergy they had just formed were not transubstantiating the Eucharistic elements, Jesuit missionaries wrote to Rome for reassurance (Bontinck 1962: ). Under the auspices of Anglo-Saxon linguistic annalists, western philosophy has recently renewed with the performatory function of certain expressions such as promises or imperatives.

All this leads the anthropologist to treat the realities of RA as factors more than figures, as renditions more than results, as realisations more than representations, as sacraments more than signs, as reificators more than reifications. A previous generation of scholars would have spoken somewhat disparagingly of magic and superstition; the present generation, less inclined to see practical applications subsidiarily proceeding from purely theoretical thought, and more aware of the fact that ideas, emotions and deeds come holistically together in existential praxis, can accept that RA not only expresses meanings but ipso facto effectuates them. RA is not only meaningful but fulfils meanings!

I often followed the WaKonongo into the surrounding forest – foraging, or on hunting and honey
gathering expeditions. Though their significance did not dawn upon me until much later, my impressions were that my hosts neither looked upon their surroundings as I did nor felt that the deeper they penetrated into the virgin forest the closer they came to Nature itself. Let us deal with this second feeling first. Though at first sight such phenomena as rain or rivers appear to be basically out there now for real for any human being to see, anthropologists, as already noted, far taking Nature and Culture as universal, univocal givens, have come to consider the natural and the supernatural as a cultural constructs peculiar to the West. And indeed when I think back on my experience, though the sacred versus profane contrast is also highly ethnocentric, the WaKonongo on entering the forest, behaved like they were in church! We walked single file as if in prayerful procession and above all respected the flora and fauna religiously in that far from being res nullius they belonged to their rightful owners, the ancestral spirits who were prepared to put them at our usufructuary disposition provided we did not abuse of them. My friends, for instance, soon made me realize that the antelopes I (mis)took to be wild life were, in fact, the domestic herds of Limdimi, the local equivalent of the Lord of the Animals. Though much of RA is (now?) to be found at some distance from settlements, archaeologists should perhaps not take it for granted that the sites seemed just as natural to the producers of RA as they do to them.

My first impression (that my companions did not appreciate the beauty of their natural surroundings as I did), could be even more relevant to the understanding of RA. Anyone who has taken a dog for a walk soon realizes that though it can see, its “world” (“le monde” of phenomenologists or the “Umwelt” of semiotic biologists) is primordially olfactory and auditory. This means that canine sight is not only secondary but specified by smell and hearing. Likewise neurophysiologically the WaKonongo saw things as I did but what they made of the data in their minds eye was quite different from my facta. This difference stemmed from the primordially oral foundations of their world and their contrast with the pre-eminently visual character of mine.

The fact of our respective worlds being so far apart was brought home to me in particular by instances of prophetical possession. Our Greek ancestors having privileged sight (“seeing is believing”, “practice stems from theory or contemplation”, “heaven is a beatific vision”), when the divine seeks to make itself and its intentions known, it puts in an appearance. Hence the apparitions and visions of Lourdes and Fatima where the Virgin declares her identity – “I am the Immaculate Conception” – and shows herself to be the Queen not only of Heaven but of Beauty itself. When ancestral spirits intervened in the affairs of the WaKonongo, they never revealed what they were in themselves (nor did people ever wonder what essentially they were or what exactly they looked like): spirits did not speak about themselves but simply said, in no uncertain terms, what should be done if disaster were to be avoided (“sacrifice a black hen at my shrine or the drought will continue”). It is worth noting too that when Moses wondered who he might be dealing with, the God of the Bible, far from making a metaphysical statement (as western theologians have thought for centuries), retorted: “Here are the Ten Commandments, what I am is my problem, yours is to get my people to do as I tell them”.

Since the WaKonongo related to one another in an exclusively oral manner, it was only to be expected that their “religious” relationships be just as purely verbal. Hence my identifying konongo religion with “interlocutory interaction” (Singleton 2009). We are surprised to hear about exceptional individuals said to be capable of whispering to horses – people like the Wakonongo, while not talking much amongst themselves, spoke out loud as much to trees and stones as to the birds and bees. If such religion is animistic it is not in the supposedly superstitious or stupid sense of projecting miniaturized souls onto inanimate objects but in the far more ethical sense of dealing with everything as if it were a person and hence an end in itself rather than a means to be preyed upon or profited by. Even the greatest of our neo-liberal moralist, Rawls, could come up with nothing “religiously” better than contractually self interested obligations – human resources warranting no more radical respect than the prudent management of their natural counterparts.

Having not only observed but participated in an overwhelmingly oral culture, the anthropologist is tempted to surmise that RA took place in even more “essentially” oral setting. This would not mean that prehistoric man’s vision was impaired but that he was (like man’s canine friend) more

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3 Archaeological digs no more uncover the facts than anthropological field work discovers them: at the most research reveals fresh data which then gives rise to thoughts informed by interpretative frameworks and finally to factual judgements. (The italics are etymological reminders of traps to avoid – “the meaning of reality is already out there now, simply waiting for someone to take of the cover” – and theories to assume – “facts from facere ‘to make’ are factualisations, elaborations or constructions”).
concerned by sound than by sight. RA must have been preceded, accompanied and followed up by the purely spoken word, by pre-literate discourse. Not only quantitatively but qualitatively, as a materialized medium of expression, in contrast to the importance and omnipresence of visual art in our modern world, RA must have amounted to a very small percentage of prehistoric messages. Unlike our artistic productions prepared in private and contemplated just as privately even in public galleries, RA, on a par with its primitive counterparts and the spoken word in general, was probably carried out in the public eye\(^4\) and always accompanied by body language\(^5\), eye contact and, on occasion, by feasting, singing and dancing, pilgrimage like peregrinations, the wearing of masks, the pouring of libations, the making of sacrifices. RA was surrounded by sound in way modern art is not.

Moreover it must have been a small but integral part of an eventful whole. Unfortunately the archaeologist, never having experienced the fact that primitives speak ephemerally of situated singularities and not knowing the concrete conjunction to which a given instance of RA corresponded (this drought, that epidemic, this man’s hunting expedition, that woman’s sterility), is inclined, on the one hand, to talk of global issues (the Climate) or abstract entities (Health), and, on the other, because the only element remaining for him to see is a surface mark, to exaggerate its (pre)historic importance. Unlike little children, RA was made to be heard more than seen! If oral religion is interlocutory interaction, RA was more likely to have been the shared reply to an urgent message concerning a quite specific life and death issue rather than an individual attempt to materialize for posterity metaphysical musings about the meaning of existence in general.

But it is not only the why, the how, the where and the when of RA which take place under the paradigmatic ceiling of orality, the who too probably answered to the same presupposition. Since the word of the elders counted for most in primary orality, one can plausibly presume that the producers of RA were senior citizens. Even more certain is the fact that their idea of authorship corresponds not to modern criteria of innovative artistic genius but to the allogistic of “primitive” anthropo-logics (Singleton 2007b). When “medicine men” attributed event the “medicines” they might have chanced upon to ancestral revelations, it is highly unlikely that the producers of RA saw themselves or were seen by others as individually inspired creators. In any case, there is every reason to suppose that Prehistoric Man’s understanding of himself was as complex as that of Primitive Man – instead our incredibly simplistic two part dualism (body versus soul), the anthropo-logic of some West African peoples, for instance, counts up to nine components.

One final but crucial consideration. Having “slashed and burned” with the WaKonongo, for years I continued to think of them as primitive agriculturalists. In fact their mode of production and the accompanying mind set was authentically nomadic. Clan elders knew where they had come from but found my wondering whether they had never wanted to return to their original homeland quite weird: the past was identical to the present in all respects but one – soil exhaustion. They were even less concerned about where they would find themselves tomorrow – the forest into which they gradually advanced seeming to be, to all intents and purposes, without end. Hence their indifference to the issues of First Beginnings and Last Ends which obsess sedentarized citizens. Had the WaKonongo produced RA (instead of contenting themselves with the song and dance appropriate to nomadic orality) it would not have represented Creation or Eschatology. The multiplicity of RA which we mentioned in a footnote is a question of substance as well as of style. There are as many irreducible forms as there are distinct milieus. For anthropologists (Douglas 1974) the informal nature of hunter gather ideology and institutions (paralleled today by the lack of structures in and the fuzziness of hippy communes or bands of new age travellers) means the what and how of their RA “lacks” the precise purpose and complicated coding one expects of more hierarchically distinctive and socio-economically stratified societies. The anthropological answer to what RA is about can only be in terms of topological plurality: there are as many incompatible languages and incompressible logics as there are distinct locations.

Once largely retrospective (“primitive societies”), the material object of anthropology has become prospective (anthropologists now do field work in scientific laboratories, development projects and

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4 Allowing of course for some forms of RA being associated with initiatory secretiveness – a fact which would make its present day interpretation even more arbitrary than usual!

5 «Accompanied » rather than « supported by », since as Jousse (2008) realized already in the 1920s, gestures while constituting an integral part of the holistic phenomenon of communication, far being at the service of ideas had something of their own to say – something the anthropologist can still grasp (as for instance in the body language of story tellers) but about which the archaeologist can only speculate.
Pentecostal movements). Being basically a method (participant observation), in my formative years (the mid 1960s in Oxford), its interpretative framework was borrowed and built from literary, classical and exegetical studies, from linguistics, history and psychology, from economics, sociology, politics, philosophy and even theology. Today, to avoid suffering unduly from paradigmatic (en) closure, anthropologists have been obliged to broaden their hermeneutical horizons in many directions such as neurophysiology and biological semiotics, ecology and globalization, linguistic philosophy, existential phenomenology and hermeneutical epistemology. Hence in the bibliographies of contemporary anthropological publications, amidst massive references to the works of near and dear colleagues, fleeting allusions to such authorities as Chance and von Uexküll, Jonas and Latouche, Wittgenstein and Austin, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, Gadamer and Ricoeur. Sympathetic outsiders, such as myself, would be interested to learn on whom archaeologist lean for interpretative inputs from beyond their academic pale when it comes to making sense of what Prehistoric Man was about and had to say.

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